Lopez v. State Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 40751 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
11-19-2013
Lopez v. State Respondent's Brief Dckt. 40751
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Lopez v. State Respondent's Brief Dckt. 40751" (2013). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 4576.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/4576
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDA 1U 
ERNESTO GARZA LOPEZ, 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
COpy 
No. 40751 
Canyon Co. Case No. 
CV-2012-2895 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF CANYON 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
PAUL R. PANTHER 
HONORABLE MORFITT 
District Judge 
ROBYN FYFFE 
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & 
Bartlett 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
(208) 343-1000 
LORI A. FLEMING 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
ATTORNEYS FOR 
RESPONDENT 
ATTORNEY FOR 
PETITIONER-APPELLANT 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................. ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ......................................................................... 1 
Nature of the Case ............................................................................... 1 
Statement of Facts and Course of Underlying Criminal 
and Initial Post- Conviction Proceedings .............................................. 1 
Course of Successive Post-Conviction Proceedings ...................................... 2 
ISSUES ........................................................................................................... 6 
ARGUMENT ................................................................................................... 7 
Lopez Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused 
Its Discretion By Striking His Pro Se Filings ......................................... 7 
A. Introduction ................................................................................ 7 
B. Standards Of Review ................................................................. 7 
C. The District Court Had Authority Under Rule 11 (a)(1) 
Of The Idaho Rules Of Civil Procedure To Strike Any 
Motion Or Pleading Not Signed By Lopez's Legal 
Representative .......................................................................... 8 
D. The District Court Acted Within Its Inherent Discretion 
In Striking Lopez's Pro Se Motion For An Enlargement 
Of Time ................................................................................... 10 
E. If The Court Erred In Striking Lopez's Pro Se Filings, 
Such Error Was Harmless ................................................ 16 
CONCLUSiON .............................................................................................. 18 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING ......................................................................... 18 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES PAGE 
Canyon County Bd. Of Equalization v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 
143 Idaho 58,137 P.3d 445 (2006) ................................................................. 7 
Commonwealth v. Padilla, _ A. 3d _, 2013 WL 5848693, 
*27 (Pa. 2013) ................................................................................................. 11 
Commonwealth v. Pursell, 724 A.2d 293 (Pa. 1999) .......................................... 11 
Ebyv. State, 148 Idaho 731,228 P.3d 998 (2010) ........................................... 7, 8 
Follinus v. State, 127 Idaho 897,908 P.2d 590 (Ct. App. 1995) ......................... 15 
Gosch v. State, 154 Idaho 71,294 P.3d 197 (Ct. App. 2012) ............................. 13 
Graves v. State, 642 SO.2d 142 (Fla. App. 1994) ......................................... 14, 15 
In re Barnett, 73 P.3d 1106 (Cal. 2003) .............................................................. 11 
Munson v. State, 128 Idaho 639,917 P.2d 796 (1996) ........................................ 3 
Nelson v. State, 274 SO.2d 256 (Fla. App. 1973) ................................................ 14 
People v. Milton, 820 N.E.2d 1074 (III. App. 2004) ....................................... 11, 12 
Rios-Lopez v. State, 144 Idaho 340,160 P.3d 1275 (Ct. App. 2007) ................. 15 
Sheppard v. State, 17 SO.3d 275 (Fla. 2009) ...................................................... 12 
State v. Baer, 132 Idaho 416,973 P.3d 768 (Ct. App. 1999) ................................ 9 
State v. Hall, 294 P.3d 632 (Ut. App. 2013) ........................................................ 11 
State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 768 P.2d 1331 (1989) ....................................... 8 
State v. Hurt, 931 S.W.2d 213 (Mo. App. 1996) ................................................. 11 
State v. Johnson, 2012 WL 9490829, *2 (Idaho App., Feb. 3, 2012) ................... 8 
State v. Ruperd, 146 Idaho 742,202 P.3d 1228 (Ct. App. 2009) ......................... 8 
State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 79 P.3d 719 (2003) ........................................ 9 
United States v. Bergman, 813 F.2d 1027 (9th Cir. 1987) ................................... 10 
ii 
United States v. Jones, 832 F.Supp.2d 519 (E.D. Pa. 2011) .............................. 1 0 
RULES 
I.R.C.P. 11(a)(1) ...................................................................................... 7, 8, 9,10 
I.R.C.P. 61 .................. '" ............................................................ '" ...... 16 
STATUTES 
I.C. § 19-4908 .................................................................................. 4, 16 
I.C. § 19-4906 ..................................................................................... 17 
OTHER 
Lopez v. State, Docket No. 37206, 2011 Unpublished Opinion 
No. 383 (Idaho App., March 11,2011) .............................................................. 2 
State v. Lopez, Docket No. 33362, 2007 Unpublished Opinion 
No. 556 (Idaho App., Aug. 17,2007) ................................................................. 1 
iii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Ernesto Garza Lopez appeals from the judgment entered upon the 
summary dismissal of his successive petition for post-conviction relief. On 
appeal, Lopez argues the district court erred by striking his pro se motion for an 
enlargement of time to respond to the court's notice of intent to dismiss. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Underlying Criminal and Initial Post-
Conviction Proceedings 
In 2006, Lopez pled guilty to felony domestic battery. (R., p.36.) The 
district court imposed a unified sentence of 10 years, with six years fixed. (R., 
p.36.) Lopez filed a Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence, which the district 
court denied. (R., p.36.) The denial of Lopez's Rule 35 motion was affirmed on 
appeal. (R., p.36.); State v. Lopez, Docket No. 33362, 2007 Unpublished 
Opinion No. 556 (Idaho App., Aug. 17,2007). 
On July 10, 2007, Lopez filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief 
alleging, inter alia, that his guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary, 
and that trial counsel was ineffective for coercing his plea. (#37206 R., pp.4-9.) 
The district court appointed post-conviction counsel, who thereafter requested 
and received an extension of time to obtain relevant transcripts and file an 
amended petition. (#37206 R., pp.22-31.) Several months after the transcripts 
were filed, appointed counsel advised the court she would not be filing an 
amended petition because she believed Lopez's original pro se petition was 
untimely. (#37206 R., pp.30-47, 57-58; see also #37206 Tr. of 12/18/08, p.1, 
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Ls.14-20.) The state thereafter answered the petition and moved for summary 
dismissal. (#37206 R., pp.60-63, 72-73.) 
At a hearing on February 20, 2009, the parties agreed, and the district 
court found, that Lopez's petition was timely filed. (#37206 Tr. of 2/20109, p.10, 
L.13 - p.11, L.4.) The court continued the matter for a hearing on the state's 
motion for summary dismissal (#37206 Tr. of 2/20109, p.11, Ls.5-24) but, before 
the hearing, Lopez filed a Bar complaint against his appointed counsel (#37206 
Tr. of 4/20109, p.13, Ls.9-20). The district court permitted counsel to withdraw 
and appointed Lopez a new attorney. (#37206 Tr. of 4/20109, p.13, L.13 - p.14, 
L.2; #37206 R., pp.104-05.) The new attorney subsequently withdrew and, on 
August 4, 2009, the court appointed a third (and final) attorney to represent 
Lopez in the post-conviction proceedings. (#37206 R., pp.114-17; #37206 Tr. of 
8/4/09, p.3, Ls.4-9.) 
On September 18, 2009, the court held a hearing on the state's motion for 
summary dismissal, at which Lopez's appointed counsel appeared and argued. 
(#37206 R., pp.118-19; see generally #37206 Tr. of 9/18/09.) Following the 
hearing, the district court granted the state's motion and summarily dismissed 
Lopez's post-conviction petition. (#37206 R., pp.138-50.) The dismissal was 
affirmed on appeal. Lopez v. State, Docket No. 37206, 2011 Unpublished 
Opinion No. 383 (Idaho App., March 11,2011) (Remittitur filed June 1, 2011). 
Course of Successive Post-Conviction Proceedings 
On March 26, 2012, Lopez filed a pro se successive petition for post-
conviction relief, and an affidavit in support thereof, essentially reasserting two of 
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the claims that were contained in his original petition. (R., pp.2-10.) Specifically, 
the successive petition alleged: (1) Lopez's "guilty plea was accepted by the 
court in violation of the federal and state due process requirement that it be 
intelligently, knowing and voluntary" (R., p.3), and (2) "Trial counsel was 
ineffective in his representation when he failed to present to the court the 
sentencing agreement that influenced him to plead guilty" (R., p.4). Lopez also 
filed a pro se "Motion For Leave To File A Successive Petition," asserting "post-
conviction counsel's negligence in failing to discern his invalid guilty plea [was] 
sufficient reason" for bringing a successive petition. (R., pp.11-15.) 
On April 11 ,2012, the district court entered an order appointing counsel to 
represent Lopez on the successive petition. (R., pp.29-31.) On April 16, 2012, 
the court issued a notice of intent to summarily dismiss Lopez's successive post-
conviction petition as being both untimely and an improper successive petition. 
(R., pp.35-43.) The court gave Lopez 20 days in which to respond to the 
proposed dismissal. (R., p.42.) 
Twenty-three days later, on May 9,2012, Lopez, filed a pro se "Motion For 
Enlargement Of Time To Respond To Notice Of Intent To Dismiss Application 
For Post-Conviction Relief.,,1 (R., pp.47-48.) In the body of the motion, Lopez 
sought an "enlargement of time to respond pro se" to the court's notice of intent 
1 The "Certification" attached to Lopez's motion indicates he "tender[ed] 
the motion to the Idaho Correctional Center for mailing on May 7, 2012. (R., 
p.48.) Assuming application of the "mailbox rule," the motion would be deemed 
to have been filed on that date. £lL., Munson v. State, 12& Idaho 639, 642, 917 
P.2d 796,799 (1996) (under "mailbox rule," pleadings filed by prose inmates are 
deemed filed on the date they are delivered to prison officials for filing). 
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to dismiss. (R., p.47.) As the basis for his request, Lopez stated: "Court 
appointed counsel's shortcomings has [sic] compelied Petitioner to ask this Court 
for meaningful opportunity to provide legal authority and facts that demonstrate 
the existence of a genuine factual issue." (R., p.47.) Lopez also filed a 
supporting affidavit in which he made the following representations: 
2. Court appointed counsel ... has been negligent as a servant 
of this court, and failed to communicate with Petitioner regarding 
this Court's intent to dismiss the application for post-conviction 
relief. 
3. Pursuant to the "mailbox" rule for prisoners, affiant's motion 
to respond pro se has been filed with this court on the date of 
certification. 
4. Affiant further makes this court aware that there will be a 
request for substitute counsel. 
5. Affiant has made his request for good cause. 
6. That affiant's interest has merit and for equitable concerns 
affiant should be allowed to pro se be given an opportunity to 
respond. 
7. That to affiant's knowledge court appointed [counsel) has 
done nothing to protect collateral benefits. 
(R., pp.44-45.) 
On May 18, 2012, the district court entered an order striking Lopez's pro 
se filings and summarily dismissing his successive petition. (R., pp.49-52.) 
Regarding Lopez's pro se motion and affidavit, the court reasoned: 
Petitioner's pro se motion for enlargement of time asserts that it 
was filed because his appointed counsel had taken no action to 
address the Court's Notice of Intent to Dismiss. Petitioner's 
affidavit contains no facts, authority or good cause challenging the 
Court's determination that his claims for relief are: 1) barred by the 
statute of limitations; and, 2) that his petition is barred by I.C. § 19-
4908. 
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Petitioner is now, and was at the time of the filing of the pro 
se motion, pursuant to his own request, represented by court 
appointed counsel. The Court, therefore, will order Petitioner's pro 
se motion and supporting affidavit, stricken. 
(R., p.50.) Noting that 31 days had elapsed since the court issued its notice of 
intent to summarily dismiss and that "no response thereto has been filed," the 
district court summarily dismissed the successive petition for the reasons 
articulated in the notice of intent to dismiss. (R., p.50.) The court subsequently 
entered a judgment of dismissal, from which Lopez timely appealed. (R., pp.79-
83.) 
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ISSUES 
Lopez states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err by striking Mr. Lopez's pro se motion 
instead of addressing his request for new counselor to proceed pro 
se and additional time to respond to the court's notice of intent to 
dismiss? 
2. Does the district court's error in failing to provide Mr. Lopez 
with a meaningful opportunity to respond to the Notice of Intent to 
dismiss require remand for appointment of counsel and an 
opportunity to respond to the district court's notice? 
(Appellant's brief, p.?) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Lopez failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its 
discretion by striking his pro se motion for an extension of time and affidavit in 
support thereof because, at the time of the pro se filings, Lopez was represented 
by counsel? 
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ARGUMENT 
Lopez Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By 
Striking His Pro Se Filings 
A. Introduction 
Lopez argues the district court erred by striking his pro se motion for an 
enlargement of time to respond to the court's notice of intent to summarily 
dismiss his successive post-conviction petition. (Appellant's brief, pp.7-11.) 
Lopez's argument fails. Because Lopez was represented by counsel, the district 
court had authority under Rule 11 (a)(1) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure to 
strike any motion or pleading not signed by Lopez's legal representative. Even if 
Rule 11 (a)(1) did not grant the court such authority, a review of the record and of 
the applicable law shows the district court acted within its inherent discretion in 
striking Lopez's pro se filings because Lopez was represented by counsel. 
B. Standards Of Review 
"The interpretation of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure is a matter of law 
over which this Court has free review." Eby v. State, 148 Idaho 731, 734, 228 
P.3d 998, 1001 (2010) (citing Canyon County Bd. Of Equalization v. 
Amalgamated Sugar Co., 143 Idaho 58, 60, 137 P.3d 445, 447 (2006). 
When a trial court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the 
appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the 
lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the 
lower court acted within the bounds of such discretion and consistently with any 
legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3) whether the 
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lower reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Eby, 148 Idaho at 734, 228 
P.3d at 1001: State v. Ruperd, 146 Idaho 742,743,202 P.3d 1228, 1289 (Ct. 
App. 2009) (citing State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 
(1989)). 
C. The District Court Had Authority Under Rule 11 (a)(1) Of The Idaho Rules 
Of Civil Procedure To Strike Any Motion Or Pleading Not Signed By 
Lopez's Legal Representative 
Although Idaho's appellate courts have never before issued a published 
opinion addressing the authority of a trial court to strike the pro se pleadings of a 
litigant represented by counsel,2 that authority appears to derive, at least in part, 
from Rule 11 (a)(1) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. That rule governs the 
"signing of pleadings, motions, and other papers" in civil cases and provides, in 
relevant part: 
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party 
represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one (1) 
licensed attorney of record of the state of Idaho, in the attorney's 
individual name, whose address shall be stated before the same 
may be filed. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall 
sign the pleading, motion or other paper and state the party's 
address. ... If a pleading, motion or other paper is not signed, it 
shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is 
called to the attention of the pleader or movant. ... 
I.R.C.P. 11 (a)(1). Pursuant to the plain language of this rule, any motion filed by 
2 The state notes the Idaho Court of Appeals has, in an unpublished opinion, 
upheld a trial court's decision to strike the pro se filings of a represented post-
conviction petitioner on the basis that "it was within the discretion of the trial court 
to require all documents to be filed by [the petitioner's] legal representative." 
See State v. Johnson, 2012 WL 9490829, *2 (Idaho App., Feb. 3, 2012) 
(unpublished opinion). The state recognizes that, because it is unpublished, the 
Johnson opinion is not precedent and is in no way binding on this Court. 
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a represented party must be signed by the party's attorney of record. Where the 
pleading or motion is not signed, the court is authorized by Rule 11 (a)(1) to strike 
it. 
Lopez acknowledges Rule 11 (a)(1) but argues the provision of that rule 
authorizing a court to strike unsigned pleadings does not apply in this case 
because Lopez signed his motion for enlargement of time. (Appellant's brief, 
p.7.) Application of well settled principles of statutory interpretation shows, 
however, that Lopez's reading of the rule is too narrow. 
It is a fundamental tenet of statutory interpretation that statutes - and, by 
analogy, court rules - must be interpreted so that effect is given to their every 
word and clause. State v. Baer, 132 Idaho 416,417-18,973 P.3d 768, 769-70 
(Ct. App. 1999). The interpretation of a statute or court rule must begin with its 
literal words. State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003). 
Those words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning and the 
statute or rule must be construed as a whole. lit 
Construing Rule 11 (a)(1) as a whole, it is apparent that the rule authorizes 
a trial court to strike the pro se pleadings and motions of parties represented by 
counsel. The rule expressly authorizes a trial court to strike pleadings, motions 
or other papers that are "not signed." I.R.C.P. 11 (a)(1). While the term "signed" 
is not explicitly defined, it is clear from the context in which that term is used that 
it means "signed" as provided for in the rule. Pursuant to the express language 
of the rule, "[e]very pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by 
an attorney shall be signed by at least one (1) licensed attorney of record of the 
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state of Idaho, in the attorney's individual name." id. Only "[a] party who is not 
represented by an attorney" is permitted to "sign the pleading, motion or other 
paper" in the party's own name. Id. Giving effect to every word and clause of 
the rule - as this Court must - there can be little doubt that a pleading, motion or 
other paper that is signed by a party in his or her individual capacity, while that 
party is represented by legal counsel, is not "signed" within the meaning of the 
rule and may therefore be stricken by the trial court. 
In this case, it is beyond dispute that Lopez filed his pro se motion for an 
enlargement of time after counsel was appointed to represent him. Because the 
motion was signed by Lopez, and not his appointed legal representative, the 
motion was effectively unsigned and the district court had authority under 
I.R.C.P. 11(a)(1) to strike it. 
D. The District Court Acted Within Its Inherent Discretion In Striking Lopez's 
Pro Se Motion For An Enlargement Of Time 
Even assuming I.R.C.P. 11 (a)(1) did not grant the court authority to strike 
Lopez's pro se filings, a review of cases from other jurisdictions shows the court 
had inherent discretion to do so. As even Lopez acknowledges on appeal (see 
Appellant's brief, p.7 (and cases cited therein)), the general rule among other 
jurisdictions is that a trial court is not required to acknowledge the pro se filings 
of a litigant - be it a criminal defendant or a post-conviction petitioner - who is 
represented by an attorney. See, SUL, United States v. Bergman, 813 F.2d 
1027, 1030 (9th Cir. 1987) (upholding trial court's refusal to acknowledge 
represented defendant's pro se filings); United States v. Jones, 832 F.Supp.2d 
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519,533 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (trial court not obligated to consider defendant's pro se 
motion to set aside plea while defendant was represented by counsel); 
Commonwealth v. Padilla, _ A.3d _, 2013 WL 5848693, *27 (Pa. 2013) 
(criminal defendant not entitled to hybrid representation and, therefore, trial court 
did not err by declining to consider represented defendant's pro se motions on 
the merits); State v. Hall, 294 P.3d 632, 639 n.8 (Ut. App. 2013) ("When a 
defendant is represented by counsel, he generally has no authority to file pro se 
motions and the court should not consider them." (internal quotations and 
citations omitted»; People v. Milton, 820 N.E.2d 1074, 1081 (III. App. 2004) 
(generally, trial court may not consider pro se motions filed by a defendant who 
is represented by counsel); In re Barnett, 73 P.3d 1106, 1110 (Cal. 2003) ("As a 
general rule, parties who are represented in court by counsel of record are 
required to proceed in court through their counsel."); Commonwealth v. Pursell, 
724 A.2d 293 (Pa. 1999) (court considering post-conviction petition not required 
to "struggle through the pro se filings" of petitioner who was represented by 
counsel); State v. Hurt, 931 S.W.2d 213, 214 (Mo. App. 1996) (trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in declining to consider defendant's pro se motion for a 
continuance filed while defendant was represented by counsel). 
An exception to the general rule that permits a trial court to ignore the pro 
se filings of a represented party apparently exists when the pro se filing is 
directed at matters concerning the representation. See,~, Barnett, 73 P.3d at 
1110 n.2 (defendants represented by counsel "may make pro se motions 
regarding representation, including requests for self-representation and for 
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sUbstitution of counsel" (internal citations omitted)); Milton, 820 N.E.2d at 1081 
("represented defendants are allowed to raise pro se claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel so long as they include supporting facts and specific 
claims"); Sheppard v. State, 17 SO.3d 275, 286-87 (Fla. 2009) (trial court 
required to consider represented defendant's pro se motion to withdraw plea 
where motion alleges adversarial relationship such as counsel's misadvice, 
misrepresentation, or coercion that led to the entry of the plea). Contrary to 
Lopez's assertions on appeal, a review of his pro se filings shows the general 
rule, not the exception, applies in this case. 
Lopez's pro se motion was both in form and substance a motion for 
additional time to respond to the court's notice of intent to summarily dismiss his 
successive post-conviction petition. The motion was specifically captioned a 
"Motion For Enlargement Of Time To Respond To Notice Of Intent To Dismiss 
Application For Post-Conviction Relief." (R., pA7.) Likewise, the body of the 
motion sought an "enlargement of time to respond pro se, to [the] Court's intent 
to summarily dismiss Petitioner's application for post-conviction relief." (R., 
pA7.) It is true Lopez also alleged in his pro se motion and affidavit that he felt 
compelled by his appointed counsel's "shortcomings" to request additional time 
to respond pro se to the court's notice of intent to dismiss. (See R., pp.45, 47.) 
But, contrary to Lopez's assertions on appeal, Lopez never requested in either 
the motion or affidavit to discharge his appointed counsel. Instead, it appears 
from the motion and affidavit that Lopez sought additional time to file a pro se 
response to the court's notice of intent to dismiss while still represented by 
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counsel (R., p.47) or, alternatively, sought additional time to file a motion for 
substitute counsel at some unspecified point in the future (see R., p.45 ("Affiant 
further makes this court aware that there will be a request for substitute counsel." 
(Emphasis added).) Either way, the motion was a request for additional time, not 
a request to discharge counsel and, as such, the district court acted within its 
discretion in declining to consider it. 
In an effort to demonstrate error in the trial court's decision to strike his 
pro se filings, Lopez appears to argue he was not actually represented by an 
attorney at the time he filed his motion. (See Appellant's brief, p.9 ("[A]lthough 
nominally represented, no attorney had been assigned to Mr. Lopez at the time 
the district court struck his request for time and dismissed his case.").) To 
support this assertion, Lopez posits that, due to the relative proximity of the 
court's order appointing counsel to the issuance of its notice of intent to dismiss, 
"the public defender did not have the opportunity to assign conflict counsel" 
before the time for responding to the notice of intent to dismiss expired. (Id.) To 
the extent this assertion is a challenge to the district court's factual finding that 
Lopez was represented by counsel when he filed his pro se motion for 
enlargement of time, Lopez has failed to carry his appellate burden of 
demonstrating clear error. See,~, Gosch v. State, 154 Idaho 71, _, 294 
P.3d 197, 199 (Ct. App. 2012) (appellate court will not disturb lower court's 
factual findings unless the findings are clearly erroneous). The record shows the 
court appointed counsel to represent Lopez almost a full month before Lopez 
filed his pro se motion. (R., pp.29, 47.) That counsel did not file any documents 
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on behalf of Lopez during that one-month period does not establish that Lopez 
was unrepresented. Lopez's assertions to the contrary are nothing more than 
bare speculation and fail to show clear error. 
Lopez next argues the district court was obligated to consider his pro se 
motion for enlargement of time because Lopez effectively alleged in the motion 
that his appointed counsel was ineffective. (Appellant's brief, pp.9-11.) To 
support his argument, Lopez relies primarily on the reasoning of Graves v. State, 
642 SO.2d 142 (Fla. App. 1994). Graves is inapposite, however, because in that 
case the defendant actually filed a pro se motion to discharge his appointed 
attorney on the basis that the attorney had been "noncommunicative, had not 
devoted sufficient time to the preparation of his case, and had yet to depose any 
witnesses." kL at 142-43. The defendant also included in his motion a "request[] 
that new counsel be appointed." kL at 143. Under those circumstances, the 
Graves court framed the issue before it as "what is the procedure which the trial 
court should follow for the purpose of protecting an indigent's Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel in a criminal prosecution where before the commencement of the 
trial the Defendant moves to discharge appointed counsel." kL (citation, internal 
quotations, and brackets omitted). Answering that question, the Graves court, 
citing its prior decision in Nelson v. State, 274 So.2d 256 (Fla. App. 1973), held 
that, upon receiving a pro se motion to discharge appointed counsel on the basis 
of ineffective assistance of counsel, the trial court should not ignore the motion 
merely because it was filed pro se but should instead "make a sufficient inquiry 
of the defendant and his appointed counsel to determine whether or not there is 
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reasonable cause to believe that the court appointed counsel is not rendering 
effective assistance to the defendant." .kL at 143-44. 
Unlike the criminal defendant in Graves - who actually had a 
constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel and moved in the trial 
court to discharge his appointed attorney - Lopez had no such right and filed no 
such motion in his successive post-conviction case. See Rios-Lopez v. State, 
144 Idaho 340, 343, 160 P.3d 1275, 1278 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing Follinus v. 
State, 127 Idaho 897, 902-03, 908 P.2d 590, 595-96 (Ct. App. 1995) (post-
conviction applicant has no constitutional right to effective assistance of post-
conviction counsel). Rather, as argued above, Lopez's pro se motion was 
merely a motion for an enlargement of time to file a pro se response to the 
court's notice of intent to dismiss while still represented by counselor, 
alternatively, to file a motion for substitute counsel at some indeterminate point in 
the future. Lopez has cited no authority, and the state is not aware of any, that 
would have required the court to consider what was at its core simply a pro se 
motion for extension of time merely because Lopez asserted in the motion and 
supporting affidavit that, to his knowledge, his appointed post-conviction counsel 
had not taken any action to address the court's notice of intent to dismiss. 
Because Lopez's pro se motion was simply one for an extension of time, 
and not a request to discharge appointed counsel, the district court acted within 
the bounds of its discretion in striking the motion because Lopez was 
represented by counsel. 
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E. If The Court Erred In Striking Lopez's Pro Se Filings, Such Error Was 
Harmless 
Even if this Court construes Lopez's pro se filings as requesting additional 
time to respond to the court's notice of intent to dismiss and as seeking to 
discharge counsel and proceed pro se, any error in the trial court's decision to 
strike the pro se filings is harmless. Rule 61 of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure provides, in relevant part: 
[NJo error or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or 
omitted by the court or by any of the parties is ground for ... 
vacating, modifying, or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, 
unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent 
with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the proceeding 
must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does 
not affect the substantial rights of the parties. 
Although Lopez argues otherwise, a review of the record in this case does not 
support Lopez's claim that the court's refusal to address his request to proceed 
pro se (assuming such request was made) violated his substantial rights. 
Lopez's pro se motion sought an enlargement of time to file a pro se 
response to the court's notice of intent to dismiss. Lopez, however, filed the 
motion after the 20-day response period had already elapsed, and he failed in 
the motion and affidavit to set forth any grounds why more time was needed or 
what information could be gathered and provided were more time granted. In 
fact, in striking Lopez's pro se filings, the district court specifically found that 
Lopez's "affidavit contain[ed] no facts, authority or good cause challenging the 
Court's determination that his claims for relief are: 1) barred by the statute of 
limitations; and, 2) that his petition is barred by I.C. § 19-4908." (R., p.50.) 
16 
In light of the court's reasoning, and in light of the fact that the court struck 
Lopez's pro se filings and dismissed the petition on the same day, it is clear the 
court would not have granted Lopez's pro se request for additional time to 
respond to the notice of intent to dismiss even had it considered it. Nor has 
Lopez argued on appeal that he was entitled to additional time beyond the 20-
day statutory period of I.C. § 19-4906(a) to respond to the court's notice of intent 
to dismiss. 3 Having failed to demonstrate either below or on appeal that he was 
entitled to a continuance, Lopez cannot show that the court's refusal to consider 
his request to proceed pro se violated his substantial rights. Because Lopez was 
not entitled to more time to respond before the district court dismissed his 
petition, granting his motion to proceed pro se in the same order that dismissed 
the case would not have changed the outcome. 
3 Lopez devotes a substantial portion of his Appellant's brief arguing what might 
have been shown had been granted additional time to respond - either pro se or 
with the assistance of substitute counsel - to the court's notice of intent to 
dismiss. (See Appellant's brief, pp.11-19.) None of the legal authority or facts 
Lopez cites on appeal were actually presented to the district court, either in 
response to the court's notice of intent to dismiss or in Lopez's pro se motion 
and affidavit for an enlargement of time and, as such, they are not properly 
before this Court for the first time on appeal. If this Court finds the trial court 
committed reversible error by striking Lopez's pro se filings, the state submits the 
appropriate remedy is simply remand for consideration of those pleadings on the 
merits. 
17 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered 
upon the summary dismissal of Lopez's successive post-conviction petition. 
DATED this 19th day of November 2013. 
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